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Constitutional-Criminal Law-Miranda Revisited: Broadening the Right 
to Counsel During Custodial Interrogation-Commonwealth v. Sher­
man, 389 Mass. 287, 450 N.E.2d 566 (1983) 
The judicially created Miranda protections require law enforcement 
officials to inform criminal suspects of their right to counsel prior 
to proceeding with custodial interrogation. I In Commonwealth v. 
Sherman,l the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered 
whether a criminal defendant validly waived his right to counsel when 
a police officer failed to inform him that an attorney, appointed to 
represent him in an unrelated case, had requested to be present dur­
ing his interrogation. 3 Concluding that, under the peculiar cir­
cumstances of the case, the defendant did not voluntarily waive his 
right to counsel, the court suppressed the defendant's in-custody 
statements to police. 4 
After receiving a tip regarding several recent house burglaries, Leon 
Manning, a state police officer, encountered Everett L. Sherman on 
a public street, and ordered him to come to the police station. s At 
the station, Manning informed Sherman that he was suspected of com­
mitting the burglaries, and gave the defendant his Miranda rights.6 
1. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444,467-73 (1966) (police must inform criminal 
defendants of right to have attorney present during questioning). The Miranda Court developed 
protections for the criminal suspect to effectuate the fifth amendment privilege against self­
incrimination. Id. at 444,469-70; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (criminal defendant not compelled 
to testify against self). The traditional protections of the fifth amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 463-64, 467; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 6 (1964). 
The Miranda Court defined custody as any significant deprivation of a suspect's freedom 
of action. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The fifth amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination is in force, and the right to counsel attaches, only when police interrogate 
a suspect while in custody. Id. at 467-73; cf. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980) 
(discussion between two police officers prompting suspect to lead police to murder weapon 
not custodial interrogation). See generally Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: 
What Is "Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. I, 63-64 (1978) (examining 
meaning and interpretation of interrogation in Supreme Court decisions). 
2. 389 Mass. 287, 450 N.E.2d 566 (1983). 
3. Id. at 289-91, 450 N.E.2d at 567-68. 
4. Id. at 287, 295-96, 450 N .E.2d at 570-71 (1983). In addition to suppressing the defen­
dant's inculpatory statements, the Sherman court remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 
296, 450 N.E.2d at 571. The court, however, did not find sufficient grounds to dismiss all 
of the charges against the defendant. Id. at 295, 450 N.E.2d at 570. 
5. Id. at 288-89, 450 N.E.2d at 567. Manning had received an anonymous tip that Foster 
Jones, Sherman'S eventual co-defendant, had committed recent house burglaries. Id. Another 
police officer informed Manning that Sherman and Jones "hung around" together. Brief and 
Appendix for Appellant at 3, Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 287, 450 N.E.2d 566 
(1983). Manning learned of Sherman's possible involvement solely from this conversation. Id. 
6. [d. at 289, 450 N.E.2d at 567. An interrogating officer noted that the suspect would 
be "easier to interview" without his attorney present. Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 
3, Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 289, 450 N.E.2d 566 (1983). 
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Earlier the same morning, Manning, while in court on a different 
matter, initiated conversation with Attorney Rita Scales because he 
knew that she had been, or was presently, representing Sherman. 7 
Manning informed Scales of his intention to question Sherman with 
regard to the burglaries and, although Scales requested that Manning 
inform her prior to any interrogation, he did not respond. 8 
Manning did not contact Scales when he brought Sherman to the 
station, and failed to inform Sherman of Scale's request to be pre­
sent during questioning. 9 After indicating that he understood his 
Miranda rights and waiving his right to counsel, Sherman made in­
criminating statements in response to Manning's inquiries. lo Prior to 
trial, Sherman moved to suppress these statements, but the judge denied 
the motion, noting that Sherman had understood his Miranda rights 
and made an intelligent waiver of counsel. II A jury found Sherman 
guilty on two counts of breaking and entering. 12 The Massachusetts 
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Sherman volun­
tarily and intelligently waived his rights. 13 The Supreme Judicial Court, 
7. 389 Mass. at 289, 450 N .E.2d at 567. Ms. Scales, a court appointed attorney with the 
Massachusetts Defenders Committee, had been appointed to represent Sherman in another break­
ing and entering case. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. After Sherman implicated himself in the burglaries, Manning transcribed the statements 
and Sherman signed them. Id. 
II. 389 Mass. at 288 n.l, 450 N.E.2d at 567 n.1. Attempting to suppress incriminating 
statements prior to trial, Sherman argued violations of his fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment 
rights. Id. The defense also argued prosecutorial misconduct required dismissal of the com­
plaints. Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 15, Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 287, 
450 N.E.2d 566 (1983). The motion judge determined that Manning's actions reasonably led 
the defendant to believe that the police were subjecting him to custodial interrogation, and 
that, under the circumstances, the defendant's freedom was "limited and restricted." Brief 
and Appendix for Appellant at 6, Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 287, 450 N.E.2d 
566 (1983). 
In ascertaining the scope of Scales' representation of the defendant, the motion judge con­
cluded that because a Massachusetts Defenders Attorney does not accept cases until appointed 
at the arraignment, Scales was not actually representing Sherman at the time of the interroga­
tion. 389 Mass. at 289-90, 450 N.E.2d at 567. Giving great weight to the fact that the defen­
dant signed the incriminating statements three separate times, the motion judge held that Sher­
man made a valid and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. See Brief and Appendix for 
Appellant at R.17-18, Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 287, 450 N.E.2d 566 (1983). 
12. 389 Mass. at 287-88, 450 N.E.2d at 566. 
13. Commonwealth v. Sherman, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 971, 971,438 N.E.2d 1098, 1098 (1982). 
In affirming the motion judge, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals applied standards set forth 
in Commonwealth v. Andjur. Id. The Andjur court recognized that there is no absolute con­
stitutional mandate for an attorney to be present during, or notified prior to, an interrogation. 
Commonwealth v. Andjur, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 777,783,390 N.E.2d 276, 280 (1979). In evaluating 
Commonwealth v. Sherman, the Supreme Judicial Court specificially rejected the applicability 
of Andjur. 389 Mass. at 290, 450 N.E.2d at 568. 
Although the appeals court also dismissed Sherman's claim of prosecutorial misconduct, 
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however, determined that Manning's failure to inform Sherman of 
Scales' request precluded a valid, intelligent waiver of his Miranda 
rights. 14 The court, therefore, suppressed Sherman's statements and 
granted him a new trial. I 5 
In Miranda v. Arizona,16 the United States Supreme Court held 
that officials must warn criminal suspects of their constitutional rights 
to remain silent and obtain legal assistance prior to commencing 
custodial interrogation. I' After Miranda, incriminating statements ob­
tained from defendants during custodial interrogation were inadmissible 
if the police had not advised a defendant of her or his rights. 18 A 
later Supreme Court case built upon Miranda to establish that once 
a suspect opts to exercise her or his right to counsel, further inter­
rogation is prohibited until counsel is provided, unless the suspect 
initiates the conversation. 19 
Although the Miranda Court acknowledged that a defendant could 
conceivably waive her or his right to counsel during custody, a defen­
dant's silence alone will not give rise to a presumption of waiver. 20 
the court admitted that "it would have been better for all concerned" if the police had informed 
Sherman of his attorney's request. Commonwealth v. Sherman, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 971, 973, 
438 N.E.2d 1098, 1099 (1982). 
14. 389 Mass. at 288, 450 N.E.2d at 566; see infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text 
(discussing rationale of Sherman court). 
15. 389 Mass. at 296, 450 N.E.2d at 571. 
16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
17. Id. at 479. The Miranda warnings were adopted to alleviate the coercive and intimidating 
overtones of custodial interrogation. Id. at 457. The Miranda Court balanced the need for 
custodial interrogation as a valid tool of police investigation against the importance of protect­
ing individual rights, concluding that limits on interrogation procedures should not unduly in­
fringe upon a proper law enforcement system. Id. at 479-91. 
18. Id. at 478-79. The Miranda Court realized that in order for the fifth amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination to be effective, the defendant needed protections to counterbalance 
the inherent coercive and compUlsive nature of police interrogations. Id. at 445-58, 467-73. 
The Court construed the right to counsel as a mechanism to protect the defendant's fifth amend­
ment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 467-78. Miranda established a presumption that 
custodial interrogation creates an inherently coercive atmosphere of police domination. Id. at 
445-58. 
Miranda created additional tension between law enforcement procedures and individual fifth 
amendment rights. See S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1968, reprinted in 1968 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2123, 2127 (Miranda results in release of guilty criminals and 
demoralization of law enforcement officials). But see Elsen and Rosett, Protections of the Suspect 
Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 645, 656 (1967) (Miranda warnings may induce 
cooperation from suspect). 
19. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1981); see ALI MODEL CoDE OF PRE­
AIlRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 140.8 (1975) (promulgating Edwards approach). See generally Note, 
Reinforcing Miranda-Restricting Interrogation After A Request for Counsel, 48 BROOKLYN L. 
REv. 593, 600-02 (1982) (discussing importance of defendant invoking right to counsel during 
custodial interrogation in determining validity of waiver). 
20. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,475-76 (1966). In a prior case, the Court defined 
a valid waiver as "an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. 
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Miranda established that when a defendant waives her or his right 
to counsel, the prosecution must prove that the defendant acted know­
ingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 21 The Supreme Court, however, 
has never clearly articulated waiver of counsel standards. 22 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that a defen­
dant cannot validly, intelligently, and knowingly waive her or his right 
to counsel after an attorney has contacted police on the defendant's 
behalf, unless police inform the defendant of the attorney's offer of 
assistance prior to the waiver. 23 In Commonwealth v. McKenna,24 the 
Supreme Judicial Court suppressed statements made by the defen­
dant during custodial interrogation after an attorney had contacted 
the police and requested to counsel the defendant during questioning. 2s 
Zerbst, 304 u.s. 458, 464 (1938). The specific circumstances of each case will determine the 
validity of a waiver. Id.; see Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513-17 (1962) (no presumption 
of valid waiver derived from defendant's silence and fact that confession eventually obtained). 
The Miranda Court stated that although a pre-interrogation request for an attorney secures 
the defendant's rights, failure to make such a request does not constitute a waiver, because 
a valid waiver cannot take place until police give a suspect Miranda warnings. Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470-75 (1966). 
21. Id. at 475. The Miranda Court required the prosecution to affirmatively demonstrate 
the voluntariness of a defendant's waiver, rather than have courts consider voluntariness as 
merely one factor in the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 467-76. To prove a valid waiver 
of counsel, the prosecution must demonstrate not only that police gave Miranda warnings to 
the defendant, but also that the defendant understood these rights and intentionally forfeited 
them. See generally Note, North Carolina v. Butler: Waiver oj Rights During Custodial Inter­
rogation, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 245, 249 (1980) (discussing background and implica­
tions of Miranda and progeny). Given these stringent standards, a state must show an affir­
mative act by the defendant in order to unquestionably demonstrate the validity of the waiver. 
Id. Under certain circumstances, however, police may infer a valid waiver from the behavior 
of a suspect during interrogation. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373-75 (1979). 
22. See generally 51 U. COLO. L. REv. 247, 250 & n.26 (1980) (discussing Miranda 
Court's lack of clear waiver standards and resulting confusion in lower courts). The Supreme 
Court's inability to articulate a clear waiver of counsel standard led to varied judicial results. 
See, e.g., Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 770 (5th Cir. 1979) (per se rule of ad­
missibility if defendant invokes right to counsel, and statement elicited without presence of 
attorney); United States v. Hopkins, 433 F.2d 1041, 1044 (5th Cir. 1970) (if suspect refuses 
to sign waiver, interrogation must cease unless suspect voluntarily initiates conversation), cert. 
denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161, 1167-69 (D.C. Cir. 
1969) (although suspect signed waiver, his refusal to allow police to take written notes con­
stitutes contradictory non-waiver); United States v. Nielson, 392 F.2d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1968) 
(setting strict guidelines for police behavior; heavy burden on interrogators to determine if suspect 
understood rights). 
23. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Santo, 375 Mass. 299, 305, 376 N.E.2d 866, 870 (1978) 
(waiver valid when attorney volunteers services to former client and police inform defendant 
of offer); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 691-92, 335 N.E.2d 660, 678 (1975) (no 
valid waiver when attorney repeatedly attempted to contact defendant in police custody, at­
torney never informed of interrogation, and defendant not informed of attorney's attempts); 
Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 319-20, 325-26, 244 N.E.2d 562-63, 566-67 (1969) 
(statements suppressed when police misled defendant's attorney as to location of interrogation). 
24. 355 Mass. 313, 244 N.E.2d 560 (1969). 
25. Id. at 324-27, 244 N.E.2d at 5~8. 
103 1984) CASE COMMENTS 
Broadly construing the defendant's Miranda rights, the McKenna court 
held that an attorney's actions may invoke the defendant's right to 
counsel subsequent to a valid waiver by the defendant. 26 
The Supreme Judicial Court similarly suppressed a defendant's in­
criminating statements in Commonwealth v. Mahnke,27 where police, 
cognizant of an attorney's repeated attempts to contact the defen­
dant, failed to notify either the attorney of the ensuing interrogation 
or the defendant of his attorney's offers of assistance. 28 Reasoning 
that the police conduct was "calculated to circumvent" the defen­
dant's rights, the Mahnke court held the defendant's statements in­
admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief. 29 In Massachusetts, 
therefore, defendants can waive their right to counsel only after police 
inform them of their Miranda rights and notify them of specific of­
fers of counsel. 30 
The Sherman court found that the failure of police to inform the 
defendant of his attorney's request critically affected his knowledge 
and, thus, his ability to make a valid and intelligent waiver of the 
Miranda right to counsel. 31 The short lapse of time between Scale's 
26. [d. The McKenna court held that a waiver of the right to counsel is effective olIly 
when a defendant is fully cognizant of all relevant circumstances. [d. Additionally, police must 
afford the defendant the opportunity to make a fresh waiver if any important circumstances 
change. See generally Comment, Criminal Procedure-Admissibility of Confessions-Dancing 
on the Grave of Miranda? 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1141, 1163 (1976) (discussing McKenna's 
broad interpretation of Miranda). 
27. 368 Mass. 662, 335 N.E.2d 660 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976). 
28. [d. at 691-92, 335 N.E.2d at 678. 
29. [d. The Mahnke court, consistent with restrictive post-Miranda decisions, held the def~n­
dant's statements available for impeachment only if voluntary and trustworthy. [d. at 692-93, 
335 N.E.2d at 678-79; see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (promulgating im­
peachment exception). 
30. Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 692-95, 335 N.E.2d 660, 678-80 (1975), 
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 323-24, 244 
N.E.2d 560, 565-66 (1969); see Commonwealth v. Santo, 375 Mass. 299, 305, 376 N.E.2d 866, 
870 (1978) (defendant validly waived rights when police informed him of former attorney 
volunteering services). 
31. 389 Mass. at 289-90, 450 N.E.2d at 568. As the Sherman court observed, when a state­
ment is obtained from a defendant, in the absence of counsel, a heavy burden rests on the 
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's waiver was knowing and 
intelligent. [d., 450 N.E.2d at 567-68. The Supreme Court has not clearly defined standards 
to evaluate waiver of counsel. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing Court's 
ambiguity regarding waiver of counsel standards). 
The Sherman court recognized the unusual circumstances of the case, but nevertheless con­
cluded that the fact that Scales' learned of Sherman's interrogation from the police was in­
significant. 389 Mass. at 295, 450 N.E.2d at 570. The court noted that the defendant or family 
members of the defendant typically notify an attorney of impending interrogation. [d.. at 293, 
450 N.E.2d at 569; see Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 692, 697, 335 N.E.2d 660, 
668, 681 (1975) (family-retained lawyer repeatedly called defendant at police station); Com­
monwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 318, 244 N.E.2d 560, 563 (1969) (defendant told aunt 
to call attorney). 
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request and the interrogation of Sherman, and the testimony of Man­
ning that he was aware of the attorney's representation of Sherman, 
persuaded the court that Sherman did not knowingly, intelligently, 
and understandingly waive his right to counsel. 32 Rejecting an argu­
ment that McKenna is inapplicable because the police did not affir­
matively frustrate the attorney's attempt to communicate with the 
defendant, the court stressed the fact that Ms. Scales had clearly re­
quested to be present at Sherman's interrogation. 33 Recognizing a 
distinction between the "deliberately misleading" police conduct in 
McKenna and Mahnke and cases of nonfeasance, the Sherman court, 
nevertheless, reasoned that under the circumstances, the police of­
ficer's failure to act vitiated the defendant's waiver of Miranda rights 
as much as an affirmative act would have. 34 Carefully limiting its 
holding to the unique facts of the case, the Sherman court suppressed 
the defendant's incriminating statements and remanded the case for 
a new trial. 3S 
The Sherman court applied and expanded the McKenna and Mahnke 
principles, placing an affirmative obligation upon police, beyond the 
32. 389 Mass. at 294-95, 45.0 N.E.2d at 570. Only a few hours passed between Attorney 
Scales' request and Officer Manning's interrogation of Sherman. Id. Additionally, only fifteen 
minutes lapsed between the defendant's arrival at the police station and his incriminating 
statements. See Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 5, Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 
289, 450 N.E.2d at 566 (1983). 
33. 389 Mass. at 293, 450 N.E.2d at 569; see Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 
263-64,431 N.E.2d 880, 892-93 (1982) (statements admissible where attorney first called police 
station after interrogation ended and police unaware that defendant's family attempted to re­
tain counsel). 
The Sherman court found that it would unfairly elevate form over substance to hold that 
Manning's failure to inform Sherman of Scales' request constitutionally significant only because 
Scales had not yet been appointed to represent the defendant in the present case. 389 Mass. 
at 295, 450 N .E.2d at 570; see supra note 11 (discussing attorney Scales' status). But see State 
v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 23-24, 29-31 (R.1. 1982) (incriminating statements admissible when 
police failed to inform defendant of attorney's availability from Public Defenders Office who 
called on behalf of the suspect's attorney). 
34. 389 Mass. at 292-96, 450 N.E.2d at 568-570. 
35. Id. at 295-96, 450 N.E.2d at 570-71. The Sherman court limited its holding as follows: 
an attorney must learn that police plan to interrogate her or his client, even on an unrelated 
charge; the attorney must inform police of her or his desire to be present at the interrogation; 
within a few hours of attorney's request, the police must interrogate the defendant in com­
pliance with Miranda warnings, yet refrain from teUing the defendant of the attorney's request; 
and, the defendant must actually make incriminating statements. Id 
The sole dissenter, however, found the persuasive determination to be that the privileges 
afforded Sherman outweighed the factor of police failing to inform Sherman of Scales' re­
quest. [d. at 296-97,450 N.E.2d at 571 (Nolan, J., dissenting). The dissent was also dissatisfied 
with the majority's handling of the publicly appointed attorney by status. See id.; see supra 
note 33 (discussing majority treatment of attorney's status); see also State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 
22, 23-24, 29-31 (R.1. 1982) (police need not inform defendant of unappointed public defender's 
offer to assist him). 
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mere generalities of Miranda warnings, to communicate specific of­
fers of counsel to criminal defendants. 36 Specifically, the court took 
an important step by recognizing that Sherman might have chosen 
to remain silent had he known that Scales wanted to be present dur­
ing his interrogation. 37 Considering many of the factors that prey upon 
an individual suspect's ability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver 
of counsel, the court broadened the scope of judicial inquiry to in­
clude a subjective examination of the defendant's actual knowledge 
at the time of the waiver. 38 By examining the defendant's actual level 
of comprehension in making the waiver,39 the Sherman decision guides 
other courts to consider subjective factors, beyond mere voluntariness, 
when evaluating the validity of a waiver of counsel. 
The Sherman decision, while remaining consistent with a recent 
Supreme Court interpretation of Miranda rights, goes further by 
simultaneously recognizing a subjective basis for determining the valid­
ity of a waiver. 40 Although the Sherman court carefully limited its 
holding,41 the decision's importance lies in the principles it asserts 
36. See 389 Mass. at 295-96, 450 N.E .2d at 570-71 (requiring police to affirmatively contact 
attorney in certain situations). Compare Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 691-92, 
335 N.E.2d 660, 678 (1975) (police deliberately withheld information from defendant and at­
torney) and Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 317-20, 244 N.E.2d 560, 567 (1969) 
(statements suppressed where police deliberately misled defendant's attorney) with State v. Bur­
bine, 45 I A.2d 22, 29-30 (R.1. 1982) (police not required to inform defendant of unappointed 
public defender's offer of assistance). 
37. 389 Mass. at 291, 450 N.E.2d at 568. The Sherman court made an important con­
tradistinction between situations where a specific attorney actually offers assistance and an il­
lusory situation where there is no identifiable attorney. [d. The court recognized that a suspect 
may conceivably react differently when she or he is informed that a particular attorney offers 
assistance, as opposed to a situation when police give general Miranda warnings of a right 
to counsel. [d. 
38. See id. at 293-96, 450 N.E.2d at 569-70 (court examines subjective knowledge of each 
party involved). The Sherman Court noted that the defendant's statements are inadmissible 
when police conduct is "calculated to circumvent" defendant's rights. [d. at 293, 450 N .E.2d 
at 569; see Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 691-92, 335 N.E.2d 660, 678 (1975) 
(statements suppressed when attorney repeatedly tried to contact defendant in police custody, 
attorney not informed of ensuing interrogation, and defendant not informed of attorney's ac­
tions); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 317-20, 244 N.E.2d 560, 567 (1969) (in­
criminating statements suppressed when police misinformed defendant's attorney as to location 
of interrogation). 
39. See 389 Mass. at 291, 450 N.E.2d at 568 (in determining validity of waiver, court ex­
amines defendant's lack of knowledge). 
40. [d. at 295-96, 450 N.E.2d at 570. Although certain minimum guidelines are mandated 
for a valid waiver, the Sherman court goes further by considering the factual and subjective 
circumstances of each particular case. [d.; see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981) 
(courts may not infer waiver of right to counsel when accused responds to police initiated 
questioning). 
41. 389 Mass. at 295-96,450 N.E.2d at 570-71; see supra note 35 (describing limited holding 
in Sherman). Although the Sherman court clearly limits the circumstances where incriminating 
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and upholds. By requiring police to affirmatively act, the Sherman 
court motivates police and attorneys to realize their responsibility for 
upholding a suspect's constitutional rights in both substance and 
form.42 Although other courts have rendered decisions effectively 
diluting Miranda rights,43 the Sherman court adheres to a comparatively 
broad application of Miranda rights during custodial interrogation. 
Commonwealth v. Sherman strengthens procedural safeguards in 
the early, but vital, stages of the criminal justice process. The Sher­
man court decisively balanced the delicate relationship of attorneys, 
police, and criminal suspects by supplying a standard of conduct, 
beyond mere formality and procedural aquiescence, to include an ele­
ment of personal responsibility. Fully realizing that criminal defen­
dants facing custodial interrogation cannot meaningfully exercise their 
right to counsel without knowing all salient information, the court 
took precautions to protect a criminal defendant's rights. Com­
monwealth v. Sherman thus succeeds in maintaining a symmetry be­
tween the conflicting interests of law enforcement institutions and in­
dividual rights. 
Beth d. Cohen 
statements should be suppressed, other courts and individual officers of the court may liberally 
interprete Sherman and thus build upon the Miranda foundations. 
42. See 389 Mass. at 295-96, 450 N.E.2d at 570-71 (court concerned with substance rather 
than form). The court raised the level of personal responsibility by mandating that individuals 
involved in the interrogation and Miranda procedure account to the court for their knowledge 
and behavior. Id. 
43. See United States v. Rimka, 512 F.2d 425, 426 (6th Cir. 1975) (continued interrogation 
did not invalidate previous Miranda waiver); Auclair v. State, 660 P.2d 1156, 1159-62 (Wyo. 
1983) (rejecting extension of right to counsel to time arrest warrant issues). But see Commonwealth 
v. Bussey, 486 Pa. 221, 404 A.2d 1309, 1314-15 (1979) (Pennsylvania requires explicit waiver 
of Miranda rights). See generally Comment, Michigan v. Mosley: A Further Erosion oj Miranda, 
13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861, 864-65 (1976) (categorizing restrictive post-Miranda cases); Com­
ment, Miranda v. Arizona, The Emerging Pattern, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 409, 414-16 (1978) 
(discussing erosion of strict Miranda principles). 
